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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/05/2006

Accident number: 378

Accident time: 12:58

Accident Date: 20/05/2002

Where it occurred: M/F 149, Bal'awin,
Bayt Yahun

Country: Lebanon

Primary cause: Victim inattention (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Handling accident

Date of main report: 25/07/2002

ID original source: BOI:No003/2002

Name of source: MACC SL

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: No.4 Israel AP blast /
frag

Ground condition: grass/grazing area
hard
rocks/stones

Date record created: 22/02/2004

Date last modified: 23/03/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: M/F 149

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report
A summarised MACC BOI report was made available in 2003. It is reproduced below, edited
for anonymity. The commercial demining company involved was asked to supply the internal
report referenced in this document in March 2003.
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Introduction
1. At the time of the accident [Commercial demining company] Manual Clearance Team No.5
were operational at the M/F 149 clearance site, at Bal’awin, Bayt Yahun. Manual Clearance
Team No.5 had been operational on M/F 149 and the adjacent M/F 256, since the 09th May
2002. A total of 4 x breaching lanes 1 x M/F to M/F cut lane and 1 x main clearance lane had
been cut into M/F 149 and M/F 256 during the previous 8 x days clearance activities, resulting
in the location of the minefield mine rows, as per the M/F records
2. A [Commercial demining company] Deminer had been clearing a cut line in an uphill
Northerly direction, from M/F 256 through to M/F 149. At a distance of approximately 100m
from the Northern limit of M/F 256, the Deminer successfully cut into the Southern part of M/F
149, locating a total number of 9 mines.
3. At approximately 12:55 hrs, the [Commercial demining company] Deminer located the
tenth Israeli No.4 Anti-Personnel (AP) mine of the day. The mine had been located in
between 2 x rocks, at a depth of approximately 3cms, in an angled position of approximately
45 degrees and with the rear portion of the mine facing uppermost. The Deminer had
excavated a large portion of the mine body, but not the actual mine fuze which would have
been facing in a downward attitude. Following this partial excavation, he then informed the
Team Leader who then ordered the Deminer to move to the rear of the lane into the safe
area, whilst full excavation and manual neutralisation of the mine took place.
4. The Team Leader then adopted the kneeling position wearing his protective jacket and
protective visor (down position). As the soil in and around the fuze was hard and in order to
gain full access so that fuze neutralisation could take place, he chose to move the second
smallest rock (farthest rock). Prior to moving the rock he probed underneath it, checking for
booby-traps, he then attempted to physically move the rock, whereupon an uncontrolled
detonation occurred.

Medical details
5. The Team Leader suffered traumatic amputations of both hands above the wrists, multiple
facial cuts and abrasions to his face, a large fragmentation wound to his inner right thigh,
primary and secondary fragmentation injuries to his groin, left thigh and left foot. The Team
Medic administered medical treatment and stabilisation on-site; casualty evacuation by road
to Bint Jubayl civilian hospital then took place.
6. On arrival at Bint Jubayl hospital, the Team Leader was transferred to the Emergency
Department where additional trauma care was administered. As major surgery is not normally
performed at Bint Jubayl hospital, the decision was then made to transfer the Team Leader to
Hammoud hospital, Sidon. He then underwent a 3 ½ hour operation where upon after he was
transferred to the Intensive Care Unit.

Conclusions
7. Based on the investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the BOI concluded the
following:
•

There was a surface detonation of an Israeli No.4 Anti Personnel mine. Evidence
shows that the crater was relatively shallow, due to the locality of the mine at the time
of detonation and the hard rocky ground that it was located in. No lifting had formed
around the edge of the seat of detonation.

•

The mine detonated whilst the Team Leader was attempting to gain access to the
fuze, and not during the actual neutralisation of the fuze.

•

The accident occurred just before the break for lunch (12:58hrs).

•

The Team Leader was in the kneeling position at the time of the uncontrolled
detonation.
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•

The traumatic amputation of the Team Leader’s hands were due to the positive blast
effects resulting from the disintegration of the Israeli No.4 mine, on the detonation of
the high explosives.

•

The Team Leader’s other injuries were sustained from both primary and secondary
fragmentation, resulting from the disintegration of the Israeli No.4 mine, on the
detonation of the high explosives.

•

The medical treatment and subsequent evacuation of the casualty by the Team
Medic was very good

•

The post-accident marking of the accident site was carried out in accordance with
current SOPs.

•

The passage of information in between the accident site, [Commercial demining
company] base location and the MACC SL was very good, with all relevant
information being passed in a timely manner.

•

The BOI agrees with and accepts [Commercial demining company] Accident and
IMSMA Reports.

•

The protective jacket maintained it’s integrity following the uncontrolled detonation of
an Israeli No.4 AP mine, at a distance ranging from approximately 10 cms to 40 cms.

•

The protective visor did not maintain its integrity following the uncontrolled detonation
of an Israeli No.4 AP mine, at a distance of approximately 40 cms, but provided
sufficient protection to ensure that the Team Leader sustained no eye damage.

8. The BOI concluded that there are two possible explanations why there was an
uncontrolled detonation, these being:
•

Whilst attempting to move the second rock, the Team Leader either inadvertently
dropped the rock onto the mine causing it to detonate, or inadvertently rolled the rock
onto the mine causing it to detonate.

•

Whilst attempting to move the second rock, the Team Leader would have been
stretching and leaning forward (consequently being in an unbalanced state), he
therefore may have lost balance and placed both hands on top of the mine.

9. The BOI also concluded that the likelihood of the mine being booby-trapped is minimal,
evidence to substantiate this are:
•

No booby-traps are detailed in the Israeli Minefield Report.

•

Due to the hard rocky soil, the setting of a booby-trap would have been extremely
difficult.

•

No physical evidence of booby-trapping was found during the BOI investigation.

Recommendations
10. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions:
•

All armed mines that incorporate a cocked striker mechanism are to be destroyed insitu. It is known that this accident and the previous accident (001/2002), occurred
whilst Team Leaders were trying to gain access to the mine in order to neutralise the
fuze. A recommendation following accident 001/2002 was that “All mines that prove
difficult to excavate or neutralise are to be destroyed in-situ (by detonation only)”.
Either clearance personnel are not adhering to this recommendation, or are finding it
difficult to distinguish between what is difficult to excavate and what is not difficult to
excavate!

•

The specific TSG related to this accident is to be reviewed by the MACC and
recommendations made to the NDO for amendment immediately but not later than 31

3

July 2002. The specific TSG to be reviewed is Chapter Four: Mine Clearance
Techniques.
•

The MACC is to propose an amendment to the National TSGs which provides clearer
guidance on manual neutralization as an authorized mine clearance technique within
the theatre of operations. Should the company wish to employ a manual
neutralization technique then they are to prepare their SOP and submit it in writing to
the MACC QA Section for approval prior to implementing the procedure in the field.
Until such time as these two issues are addressed the procedures detailed in
National TSGs are to apply (Ref: NDO TSGs, Issued Mar 2002, Chapter 4, paras
4.11-4.13, 4.15-4.17).

•

The current blanket restriction placed on the manual neutralization of all mines is
withdrawn with effect the acceptance of this report by the NDO Representative,
however, the techniques detailed in Chapter 4 of the TSGs are to apply until such
time as the Company SOPs for manual neutralization are submitted and approved.

•

Team Medics are to ensure that all operational personnel drink sufficient quantities of
liquids, and take regular breaks during demining operations, especially during times
of hot weather (every 60 minutes as per National TSGs).

•

The density of the minefields in which the teams are working, the rocky and hard
ground, and the working temperature on the day have all been contributing factors to
this accident. It is clear from the evidence that the injured Team Leader was not in
the act of physically neutralizing the mine. This has been an unfortunate accident
and there can be no fault directly attributed to the Team Leader’s actions.

•

The conclusions detailed in this report be distributed and discussed among all
[Commercial demining company] Operational Field Staff.

Signed:

QA Officer, Mine Action Co-ordination Centre Southern Lebanon, July 2002

Victim Report
Victim number: 495

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: no

Compensation: Not made available
(insured HMT)

Time to hospital: Not recorded

Protection issued: Long visor

Protection used: Long visor; Frontal
apron

Frontal apron

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Face
severe Foot
severe Genitals
severe Legs
AMPUTATION/LOSS
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Hand Both
COMMENT
The Victim suffered unspecified groin injury. No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Victim inattention” because it is likely that the
Victim slipped and initiated the mine by placing both hands on top of it. The secondary cause
is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because the Victim was a member of the site
management team and appears to have been breaching a previous MAC directive that no
attempt should be made to disarm mines that were difficult to expose.
The accident report is noted as “inadequate” because the “summarised” report does not
include sufficient detail in critical areas. It is possible that the full report would correct these
failings. The summarised report does not detail the damage to the visor and the Victim’s face
– which are crucial to determining whether the visor was worn raised and whether the visor
performed inadequately. The report does not specify the fuze type found on other mines in
the area, so identifying which type of No.4 fuze was likely to have been involved in the
accident. Further, the report “accepts” the internal investigation and IMSMA report without
including them. And it does not refer to or include witness statements which can help when
wanting to later assess and confirm the chain of events.
The No.4 mine (Israel) contains 188g TNT as a main charge and testing indicates that a 5mm
thick polycarbonate visor would not normally shatter when more than 30cm from such an
initiation. Visors have broken when presented at an offset angle to the blast event, but that
breaking is usually limited so that the visor ends up in several large pieces. If a stone
shattered and the visor was sprayed with large stone pieces, that would have made a wellmade visor in good condition shatter. More detail in the report would have allowed an
assessment of whether the visor performed adequately.
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